Some argue that a major historical strength of agricultural economics has been its tolerance for a range of methodological approaches. Early agricultural economists drew on production agriculture, accounting and business, classical, neoclassical, and institutional economics. Some have even argued that the very parochialism and fragmentation of agricultural economics have been the basis for many of its most important contributions . In a different vein, Bonnen has argued that “… agricultural economics has been drifting toward an anti-empirical and a disciplinary outlook, away from the great empirical tradition around which the profession was built and upon which its reputation ·still rests.” – While some have identified excessive fragmentation along geographic and sub-disciplinary lines as a factor limiting the effectiveness of agricultural economics , others have taken refuge in the glowing account expressed by Leontief in his presidential address to the American Agricultural Economic Association: “An exceptional example of a healthy balance between theoretical and empirical analysis and of the readiness of professional economists who cooperate with experts in the neighboring disciplines is offered by agricultural economics as it developed in this country over the last fifty years.” Few would argue that Leontiefs observations which focus on the period of 1920 through 1970 still hold with equal force today.
Does the diversity within agricultural economics enhance or detract from the creation of knowledge? An appropriate degree of diversity creates cross fertilization of ideas and a healthy tension which exposes inferior applications. But has the diversity become excessive? Given the degree of diversity within the AAEA,indoor growers do the current policies and practices of the association enhance or detract from the creation of useful knowledge? Do the media products of the AAEA promote and encourage new ideas, methods, institutions, theories, data, or articulation of important problems? Do they foster scientific inquiry, dialogue, and debate? What are the research values of our collective organization, the AAEA? The objective of this paper is to assess the above questions. Professions are clubs whose tribal behavior should be examined from time to time in order to evaluate whether they are on a path to extinction.. Accordingly, o~ purpose here is to make an assessment of our current professional state which reflects not only our views but the collective views of the AAEA membership. In making our assessment and evaluation, the current configuration of the profession is taken as given . The paper begins with a review of some anecdotal evidence in the next section followed by some data based evidence on the current state of the profession.
Some selected problems for which little or no empirical evidence is available are highlighted. The argument is made that the value of the profession and role of data in advancing knowledge has led to a number of serious self. imposed limitations. The tendency of the profession toward solution-rich or technique-oriented approaches is examined. These problems have hindered creativity a~d left the profession unable to take advantage of the opportunities for innovations that have been available. In essence, we shall argue that many missed opportunities are the result of the profession tinkering at the margins rather than designing, reforming, and promoting more effective institutions . These themes largely reflect subjective interpretation of the anecdotal evidence. To support or refute this interpretation, results of a survey of the AAEA membership are presented. This survey was conducted in the spring of 1989 and provides the database for analytically judging the interpretations and perspectives of anecdotal episodes presented herein.A number of major shocks have occurred in both U. S. and world agriculture over the last few decades. None of these shocks or their impacts were anticipated by publications of the profession. For example, the huge commodity price explosion of the early 1970s surprised all interested observers. No ex ante analysis was conducted prior to 1971 that even weakly suggested such a price explosion was a realistic possibility.
Many ex post analyses have now been conducted that isolate the Soviet grain deal, the deregulation of the overvalued dollar, trade barriers, and worldwide economic growth as some of the explanations for the events of the early 1970s. In fact, not until three years after the fust devaluation of the dollar and two years after its deregulation did anyone in the profession attempt to evaluate its implications for U. S. agriculture . It is important to note that this study was based on personal understanding and experience and involved the heuristic application of basic economic principles. The study did not formally analyze any secondary or primary data. Furthermore, if secondary time series data had been utilized at that time, no.significant effect would have been isolated between exchange rates and any performance measures for U. S. agriculture because of limited data availability following devaluation. In the early 1980s those concerned with U. S. and world agriculture were again surprised. Although there were studies In the late 1970s of the relationship between the macroeconomic environment and U. S. agriculture, few if any serious ex ante analyses were reported in the literature. Perhaps more importantly after the Volcker Federal Reserve Policy Announcement of 1979, no ex ante analysis was reported by the profession on the potential effect of real interest rate increases on U. S. agriculture. It was not until commodity markets plummeted in 1981 that the potential effects of monetary and fiscal policy on U. S. agriculture were seriously evaluated. Since the macroeconomic environment had been reasonably stable over much of the 1960s and 1970s, ex post historical analysis could not identify a significant relationship between nominal or real interest rates and the U. S. agricultural sector . To address this difficulty, Freebairn, Rausser, and de Gorter developed a simulation model with some empirically estimared and some hypothetical parameters to explain the events of 1981. Similarly, Just demonstrated that an extended capitalization formula calibrated to preVolcker events could have predicted the land price decline beginning in 1982 in terms of interest rate and inflation phenomena. But these types of approaches could have been undertaken as early as late 1979 or early 1980.
Given the vulnerability of U. S. agriculture in 1980 to optimistic expectations, why did the profession not provide some crisp but qualified warning signals? Conventional wisdom today is that U. S. macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s helped destroy U. S. agricultural export potential while escalating its costs and leaving it in the deepest financial crisis since the great. depression. Why was this possible outcome not even remotely entertained in the forums of the profession in the early 1980s? Again, it is important to note that the early studies which began to sort out the role of new phenomena affecting agriculture were based on personal understanding and experience and involved the heuristic application of basic economic principles. The lesson of these war stories is that when undue weight is placed on ex post data analysis, future events will always present surprises. These same points arise in a number of current topical problems. For example, with respect to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations,danish trolley there have been no serious evaluations of the dynamic path that might result from any proposals that- have been tabled by the U. S. Trade Representative.The profession has imposed a number of limitations on what constitutes acceptable research.The philosophical base for much of this focus is provided by Popper. Popper emphasizes explanation of observable phenomena and introduces the notion of falsification as the rigorous standard for scientific procedure. Kuhn, in his study of scientific progress, found no support for Popper’s idealization for science-falsifying instances seldom lead to the revocation of theory. Among economists, McCloskey has advanced the view that economic research is basically essays in persuasion. One of the dominant characteristics of the profession is its insistence on objectivity. Objectivity is much like motherhood and apple pie; if it could be achieved, we would all warmly welcome its presence. The difficulty, however, is that in principle an infinite number of hypotheses are capable of explaining a given finite body of non-experimental data. Accordingly, the only objectivity that exists emanates from the clash of individual subjectivities. As Keynes argued long ago, “It;is astonishing what foolish things one can temporarily believe if one thinks tou long alone….” Discussion and debate with colleagues provide a useful defense against one’s own foolish subjective beliefs. In the context of falsification and the explanation of observable phenomenon, a number of solution techniques have been developed from mathematical statistics, econometrics, operations research, etc. This technology has been utilized sometimes wisely and sometimes unwisely. In general, the technology imposes a logic which limits the role of intuition. In contrast, it is interesting to observe how many members of the profession that trade in futures markets do so on the basis of formal econometric models as opposed to intuition and heuristic application of economic principles.
The technology that has been embraced by’ the profession is largely computer based. In many research applications, this technology has been used as a substitute for creativity and seriolls thought. In fact, available technology along with its standardized solutions often leads to a “have model will travel” mentality.- For some years now, the AlAE and AAEA meetings have been dominated by solution-oriented or technique approaches. This professional behavior has severely limited originality. Many of our recent graduates spend most of their time wondering about the applications they can make of standardized solution frameworks rather than finding interesting problems that require the development of customized frameworks. Given the small weight our profession places on case studies and induction, this is not surprising. Due to self-imposed limitations and the promotion of a solution rich environment, our profession has missed many opportunities for creativity. This is especially in the field of new institutional economics. As Ruttan and Hayami have argued, the largest payoff to the public interest is to the area of institutional innovation. For example, throughout the world there is a serious problem of financing public good and infrastructure investments in agriculture. In the case of the United States, Bonnen argues “… that responsibility for coordination of agricultural science policy is shifting from a predominantly public function to more of a shared public and private responsibility, making both policy and its coordination more complex.” What institutional frameworks have been advanced by our profession to determine sustainable burden sharing arrangements between the public and private sector to finance various quasi-public goods? Does our profession encourage and reward its members for designing such institutions? On the methodological front, why has so little effort been undertaken to explain collective organizational behavior. Why have no basic propositions been empirically tested that focus on the distribution of power in collective groups? We always find members with unequal influence being compensated by collective organizations. Why have we not exploited our traditional relationships with rural sociologists and other disciplines to advance the frontiers of knowledge in this area of inquiry?From the anecdotal evidence outlined above, a number of questions and hypotheses emerge. Some of these hypotheses relate to the linkages among academic, extension, industry, and government – components of the profession. Do the applied components of the AAEA find different approaches effective than are emphasized by academic components and the med!a ? How does the importance of f0011al models and econometric analysis vs. heuristic application of economic principles and intuition differ among the various components of the profession? Are the channels of communication among these various groups within the Association highly integrative and interactive or are they channeled and separate? How well are the problems faced in the applied components of the profession communicated to the academic community and how well do the products of the academic community serve the applied components? In acquiring human capital, what is the best relative emphasis of training on various types of techniques, conceptual frameworks, and case studies, and how does that compare with the training that has been received? Many other questions naturally arise. What empirical evidence is used in the analyses conducted by members of the Association? Are the frameworks of analysis used by the various components of the ‘profession formal or informal?